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PEOPLE V. QUINN
[61 C.1d 151: 39 Cal.Rptr. 393. 393 P.2.:! 7051

[Crim. No. 7741.

In Bank.
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July 14,1964.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SAMUEL R.
QUINN, JR., Defendant and Appellant.
[Ia,1b] Criminal Law-Evidence-Confession8-Voluntariness.Defendant's admissions to a probation officer after he had
pleaded guilty to one of the offenses charged against him were
involuntary and thus inadmissible against defendant at a
trial of the charges after he had been allowed to withdraw his
guilty plea and to plead not guilty, where the probation officer,
who was to make a report and recommendation to the trial
judge before sentencing following the guilty plea, advised defendant to tell the truth and told him that he would not recommend probation if defendant failed to tell the truth.
[2] ld.-Evidence-Confessions-Voluntariness.-A confession or
admission induced by promises of leniency or by threats is
involuntary and therefore inadmissible.
[3] ld.-Evidence-Admissions-Plea of Guilty Subsequently
Withdrawn.-Where defendant pleaded guilty to one of the
charges against him but subsequently was allowed to withdraw
such plea and enter a not guilty plea to all the offenses
charged, evidence of the withdrawn guilty plea was inadmissible at defendant's subsequent trial. (Disapproving People v.
Clay,208 Cal.App.2d 773, 777-779 [25 Cal.Rptr. 464]; People v.
Ivy, 163 Cal.App.2d 436, 438-440 [329 P.2d 505]; People v.
Snell, 96 Cal.App. 657, 662-663 [274 P. 560]; see People v.
Russell, 77 Cal.App. 113, 120 [246 P. 110] holding such a plea
admissible. )
[4a,4b] ld.-Double Punishment.-In a prosecution for robbery,
theft of an automobile and unlawful possession of narcotics, it
was error to sentence defendant to concurrent sentences for
robbery and possession of narcotics where such offenses were
part of an indivisible criminal transaction.
[5] Id.-Double Punishment.-Concurrent sentences are double
punishment within the meaning of Pen. Code, § 654, proscribing
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 423; Am.Jur., Evidence (1st ed
§ (82).
[3] Propriety and prejudicial effect of showing, in criminal
ease, withdrllwn guilty plea, note, 86 A.L.R.2d 326. See also Am.
Jur., Evidence (1st ed § 6(7).
McX:. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 467(7); (2] Criminal Law, § 465; [3] Criminal Law; § 449(3); [4-6] Crinlinal
Law, §1475.
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double punishment of a criminal act that constitutes more than
one crime.
[6] Id.-Double Punishment.-Pen. Code, § 654, proscribing double
punishment of a criminal act that constitutes more than one
crime, applies not only when there is one act in the ordinary
sense, but also when there is a course of conduct that constitutes an indivisible transaction punishable under more than
one statute.

Prosecution for armed robbery, theft of an automobile and
City and County of San Francisco. Harry J. Neubarth,
Judge. Reversed.
Prosecution for armed robbery, theft of an automobile and
illegal possession of narcotics. Judgment of conviction reversed.
Benjamin Y. Davis and George Franklyn Duke for Defendant and Appellant.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, Albert W. Harris, Jr.,
and Edward P. O'Brien, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
TRA YNOR, J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment of
conviction entered upon a jury verdict finding Mm guilty of
first degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 211a) , theft of an
automobile (Veh. Code, § 10851), and unlawful possession of
narcotics (Health & Saf. Code, § 11500). He was sentenced to
imprisonment in the state prison with the sentences to run
concurrently on all three convictions.
Early in 1962, two masked men robbed the College Pharmacy in San Francisco, taking cash and narcotics. They
escaped in an automobile stolen the previous nillht. Defendant
was later identified as one of the two men and was indicted
for armed robbery, automobile theft, and possession of narcotics. Defendant's plea of guilty to the charge of robbery
was accepted, and the court dismissed the two other charges
on motion of the Prosecution. A motion for probation was
continued for hearing and determination. Thereafter, the
court permitted defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty.
The two other charges were reinstated, and defendant pleaded
not gui1t~r to all three.
\
A San Francisco probation officer testified over objection
that defendant had previously been arraigned on the same

.
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three charges and had pleaded guilty to robbery. The officer
also testified, again over objection, that immediately after the
guilty plea, he interviewed defendant in preparing a presentence probation report and that defendant admitted that
his motive for the robbery had been to get narcotics, that he
J}ad used a "phony" gun, and that he had stolen the automobile used in the robbery. The probation officer testified that
he always tells convicted defe.ndants interviewed in preparing probation reports that "if they are not telling us the
truth, then we most certainly would not recommend probation for them. "1
IThe probation officer testi1led:
"Q.••• You actually never promise anybody,or promised him, or
anybody else probation, do you'
"A. No.
"Q. No. But you do tell them that if they cooperate by telling you
everything that they 'know about an incident, that it will serve them well
later on with the Court, is that right'
, 'A. Most eases we would, yes. I'm not certain whether I did in this
ease. But it's not unusual for us to use terms along that line.

".

"Q. And so you tell them that you have to take this report and
furnisl:. it to the Court, and if they cooperate with you and tell you
everything that they know that it certainly is to their benefit'
"A. Wc don't use the term 'eooperate with us' so much as we tell
them to tell the truth, beeause it helps everybody to be honest and
sincere in their statements.
, 'Q. And ian't there more or leas '" an implication on your part that
if they tell you all the factors ••• and relate everything that they do
know, that they stand a better ehance of getting probation or better
ehance of getting a lighter sentence'
"A. Well, we tell them that by telling the truth they stand a better
chance of having us recommend probation, because if they tell 1lIl state·
ments that we find out through our investigation are not true, then we
will not recommend probation for them.

".

...

"Q. Well, in your opinion, Mr. Jenkins, would it appear that Mr.
Quinn was giving you a statement more or leas thinking that the more he
told you about this particular charge that the better he would be
treated by you; in other words, that he would benefit from his state·
menU

..

"THE WITNESS: I thought that Mr. Quinn was just being honest
with me.
,
, 'Q. But prior to his being honest with you, did you represent in any
way whatsoever that he would gain ~ any respect whatsoever by being
honest with you'
"A. I probably did teU him that; I tell that to everybody, that by
being honest with us they are helping tllemselves; if I can explain this
properly, I tell them if they are Dot telling us the truth, then wc most

)
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[la] Defendant contends that his admissions to the pro.
bation officer were involuntary. [2] A confession or admis.
sion induced by promises of leniency or by threats is in.
voluntary and therefore inadmissible. (People v. Underwood,
ante, pp. 113, 120·121 [37 Oa1.Rptr. 313,389 P.2d 937] ; People
v. Brommcl, 56 Ca1.2d 629, 632-634 [15 Oal.Rptr. 909,364 P.2d
845] ; People v. Trout, 54 Cal.2d 576, 583 [6 Cal.Rptr. 759,
354 P.2d 231, 80 A.L.R.2d 1418] ; People v. Rogers, 22 Cal.2d
787, 805 [141 P.2d 722] ; cf. Hayncs v. Washington, 373 U.S.
503,513 [83 S.Ct.l336, 10 L.Ed.2d 513,520.521]; Lynumn v.
Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 [83 S.Ct. 917,9 L.Ed.2d 922, 926];
Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556,560 [74 S.Ot. 716, 98 L.Ed.
948, 952].) [lb] The probation officer, who was to make a
report and a recommendation to the trial judge before sentencing, told defendant that he would not recommend probation if defendant failed to tell the' truth. Defendant's admissions following this threat or implied promise of leniency
were therefore involuntary, and their introduction into evidence requires reversal. (People v. BrommeZ, -supra, 560a1.2d
629, 634; People v. Trout, supra, 54 Ca1.2d 576, 585.)
Other questions remain that may arise on a retrial. [3] De·
fendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting
evidence of his withdrawn plea of guilty. Penal Oode sections
1192.1 through 1192.3 provide that a defendant cannot be
punished for a higher degree of crime or by a more severe
punishment than that specified in a plea of guilty accepted
by the prosecution and approved by the court. Section 1192.4
provides that if a defendant's plea of guilty is not accepted,
he may withdraw it, and it may not be used in evidence. In
People v. Hamilton, 60 Ca1.2d 105, 112·114 [82 Cal.Rptr. 4,
383 P.2d 412], and People v. Wl'lson, 60 Oa1.2d 189, 155-156
[32 Cal.Rptr. 44, 383 P.2d 452], we excluded evidence of an
offer to plead guilty. Although offers are not expressly covered

.' .~-)

certainly would not recommend probation for them. I put it that
it'. in the negative.

".

. . . ... . . . . . . . . .

".

.

'WIQ'.

..

"Q. You told him that if he didn't ten the truth that there would be
no possible ehanee for probation, ian't that right!
"A. No, I wouldn't ten him that. I ean't lay whether he will pt
probation or not, :Mr. Davia. I don 'to"Q. But you have a right to make a reeommendationt
CIA.. Oh,yell.
I I Q. To the Superior-.
I I A. I ten them if they don't tell us the truth, the probabilit,.-Iu
taet it is almost certain we would not reconll.llend probation for them if
!-hey don't ten us the truth."
,

)
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by section 1192.4, they are within its policy. Excluding
withdrawn pleas of guilty also furthers c, the obvious purpose" of section 1192.4 to encourage the settlement of criminal cases. (People v. Hamilton, S1/pra, 60 Ca1.2d 105, 112.)2
Evidence of defendant's withdrawn plea of guilty was
tllerefore inadmissible. Earlier eases holding such a plea ad- .
missible (People v. Clay, 208 Cal.App.2d 773, 777-779 [25
Cal.Rptr. 464] ; People v. Ivy, 163 Cal.App.2d 436, 438-440
[329 P.2d 505); People v. Snell, 96 Ca1.App. 657, 662-663
[274 P. 560); see People v. Russell, 77 Cal.App. 113, 120
[246 P. 110) are disapproved.
[4a] The trial court also erred in sentencing defendant to
concurrent sentences for first degree robbery and possession
of narcotics. [5] Section 654 of the Penal Code proscribes
double punishment of a criminal act that constitutes more
than one crime, and concurrent sentences are double punishment. (People v. Kehoe, 33 Ca1.2d 711, 716 [204 P.2d 32] 1;
People v. Nor Woods, 37 Ca1.2d 584, 586 [233 P.2d 897].)
[6] The section applies not only when there is one 8rt in
the ordinary sense, but when tlJere is a course of conduct tlHlt
constitutes an indivisible transaction punishable under 1ll0l'P
tlIan one statute. (People 'Y. McFarland, 58 Ca1.2d 748! 760
2A majority of recent eases considering the question have held that
withdrawn pleas of guilt,. are inadmissible. (Bee eases collected in 86
A.L.R.2d 326.) Various reasons have been given for this rule: (1) An
order withdrawillg a plea of guilty annuls the plea for all purposes
(Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224 [47 S.Ct. 582, 71 L.E'l.
1009, 1012]; but see State v. Thomson, 203 Ore. 1, 17 [278 P.2d 142,
149] (concurring opinion); 4 Wigmore, Evidenee (3d ed.) § 1067 at p.
66, n. 2); (2) admission of the plea violat('s the prh-i1ege against selfincrimination (Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d 265, 274-275 [75 App.
D.C. 274, 141 A.L.R. 1318, 1329-1330] (Rutledge, J.»; (3) a plea of
guilty is not within the admission exeeption of the hearsay rule, for it is
often based on motives other than admitting guilt (see State v. Weekly,
41 Wn.2d 727, 731 [252 P.2d 246, 250] (dissenting opinion); d. Wood
v. United States, sU1Jra, ]28 F.2d 265, 273 [75 App.D.C. 274, 141 A.L.R.
1318, 1327-1328]; but see People v. Spitaleri, 9 N.Y.2d 168, 172 [173
N.E.2d 35]); (4) admitting the plea into evidence is inconsistent with
the privilege to obtain its withdrawal (see, e.g., Kercheval v. United
Statcs, aupra, 274 U.S. 220, 224-225 [47 S.Ct. 582, 71 L.Ed. 1009, 10121013]; People v. Ryan, 82 Cal. 617, 619 [23 P. 121], disapproved in
People v. Boyd, 67 Cal.App. 292, 303 [227 P. 783] (opinion of Supreme
Court denyinlt hearing); People v. Spitaleri, aupra, 9 N.Y.2d 168, 172·
] 73). TlIis last reason for excluding the plea is the most persuasive. A
trial judge may alld sometimes must permit a plea of guilty to be
withdrawn for" good cause showrl." (Pen. Code, § 1018.) The privilege
to withdraw the plea is eft'ecth'ely nullified if it can be introduced
against the defendant later.

)
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[26 Cal.Rptr.473, 376 P.2d 449]; Neal v. State o/California, s'
55 Ca1.2d 11, 19 [9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839]; PeopZe v.'
Brown,49
Ca1.2d
[320 P.2d
[4b] In the
the present case, the
theft577,
and591
possession
of 5].)
the narcotics,
theft ·.·•.:1.'· .
of the money, and the robbery were all part of an indivisible
criminal transaction. (People v. McFarland, supra, 58 Cal.2d
748, 760; People v. Griffin, 209 Cal.App.2d 125, 129 [25 Cal.
Rptr. 667]; People v. Nor Woods, supra, 37 Cal.2d 584, 586;
People v. Kehoe, supra, 33 Ca1.2d 711, 715.) Accordingly, if
on retrial defendant is convicted of both possession of narcotics and robbery, he may be sentenced only for first degree
robbery, the more serious of the two offenses. (People v:
McFarland, supra, 58 Ca1.2d 748, 762-763.) The theft of the
automobile was a separate crime completed before the robbery was committed j if defendant is convicted thereof on
retrial he may also be sentenced for that theft.
The judgment is reversed.

Gibson, C. J., McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J.,and
Peek, J., concurred.

